

Ambush Book



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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the years there were vehicle attacks that change the way we train. They received the attention of the security community and the businesses they serve.

There have been “Game Changing Incidents” - Vehicle Attacks that have changed the skill set required to do the job – either close protection or security driving, and created the lessons learned that are used in training.

THE EVENTS

Hans Martin Schleyer
Aldo Moro
Alfred Herrhausen
John Butler

Moro and Schleyer drew attention because they had “protection.” These two incidents did more for the training business than any others. The conclusion that most everyone came up with was that the protection was not real. It’s also the two incidents that started the serious folks to look at surveillance detection. Moro and Schleyer were protected by bodyguards that had all the right stuff – but they were still kidnapped and their bodyguard teams eliminated rather easily. Both attacks exhibited meticulous planning.

Butler and Herrhausen were game changers because of the use of roadside bombs. Today roadside bombs are common place. Butler was one of the first executives (1981), to have a roadside bomb used as an assassination tool. Although he survived the attempt the Butler incident signaled a shift from kidnapping the executive, to assassination. The complexity of the Herrhausen incident was a huge wake up call for the security community; he appeared to have “good” security supplied by competent people. They were looking for problem A (A Moro/Schleyer incident) and got problem B (a roadside bomb). These two events changed forever the way surveillance detection was used as a defense.

THE ATTACKS

THE HANS MARTIN SCHLEYER SCENARIO



On September 5, 1977, shortly after 5:00 PM, Schleyer left his office in Cologne Germany to drive home.

He took his usual route home in his chauffeur-driven Mercedes.

At approximately 5:00 PM the Baader – Meinhof group could count on the Schleyer two car convoy to be at this intersection

Schleyer is in the lead (blue) car – a non armored Mercedes - he is sitting in the back seat – no other security other than the driver.

His car is followed by another non armored Mercedes (white) with a driver and two security personnel – all police officers.

As they turn into the street there is a VW Micro Bus parked at the corner. The occupants of the vehicle are members of the Baader-Meinhof group

About halfway down the street a car driving in the wrong way down the one way street approaches Schleyer vehicle.

A lady with a baby carriage is standing on the sidewalk – in the baby carriage was an automatic weapon.



Also standing on the sidewalk was two other members of the BMG

Elapsed time – 20 Seconds

The car driving the wrong way quickly cuts in front of Schreyer's car and forces his car to turn sharply to the right and drive into the curb

As the blocking car turned into the two car convoy the lady pushed the baby carriage into the street, this was to block the street in the event Schreyer's driver decided to drive around the car that blocked the road.

The second car, containing the bodyguards crashed into the rear of Schreyer's car; Elapsed time – 30 Seconds.

The terrorists, who were parked in the Volkswagen van, walked up to the backup car with the bodyguards and fired their weapons, sub guns and a shot gun into the bodyguard car.

The lady with the baby carriage and two other members of the RAF standing on the side of the road, also fired into the bodyguards car

A passenger in the blocking vehicle came walking up to the driver of Schreyer's car and shot him at point-blank range; the shooter was careful not to hit Schleyer; Elapsed time – 40 Seconds



Attack from different angle



Schleyer was taken from the Mercedes and put into the Volkswagen van.

As an indication of the planning and organization involved in the ambush and kidnapping, it took about 90 seconds.

The Van backed out of the street and drove to an underground garage. They put Schleyer into another vehicle and drove away.

The obvious planning and attention to detail in this kidnapping was remarkable even when compared to the precision tactics of other kidnappings.


THE ALDO MORO SCENARIO



The kidnapping of the highly respected elder statesman of Italian politics, Aldo Moro, shocked the world. The kidnapping of Aldo Moro would be similar to the kidnapping of former President Clinton or Bush. At the time Italy came to a standstill.

Shortly after 9:00 a.m., having stopped at a nearby church for communion, Moro was en route to Parliament. He went to the same church, at the same time every morning. He established a pattern that was easy to figure out. Every morning you could count on

Aldo Moro being at the same intersection at the same time.



Moro was sitting in the backseat of his vehicle with a driver and bodyguard sitting in the front seat.


Three security guards followed in another vehicle. They were followed by a vehicle with two members of the terrorist group - the RAF.

As they approach the intersection there were four men dressed in Alitalia Airline uniforms standing at the intersection. They appear to be waiting for a bus – but they are members of the RAF. In their flight bags they

have automatic weapons.

RAF vehicle passes and cuts in front then slams on the break causing Moro's car to crash into it.

The RAF driver and passenger from the blocking car get out as if to check whether there had been any damages.



Approaching Moro's car from both sides, they pulled out pistols and shot the driver and security guard that were sitting in the front seat of Moro's car, killing them instantly. Elapsed time – 15 Seconds

At the same time the four men in the Alitalia Airline uniforms approached the backup car and, with their automatic weapons killing two of the three instantly. Elapsed time – 20 Seconds

The third security officer rolled out of the car onto the street and was able to get three shots off before he was neutralized by a fatal shot from a sniper on a nearby roof.

Moro was transferred, along with a briefcase containing official documents and another containing medications, to another a vehicle that pulled up alongside the ambush.

They drive away from the ambush - total elapsed time – 45 Seconds. They try to negotiate the release of jailed RAF members. Negotiations failed – they assassinated Moro.

The obvious planning and attention to detail in this kidnapping was remarkable even when compared to the precision tactics of other kidnappings.

The escape route involved entering a restricted street which was closed off with a padlocked chain. The kidnappers were prepared for this with bolt-cutters.

A simulated accident in the near vicinity diverted traffic from the site of the attack were diverted from the attack area by false bomb reports in other areas

The telephone system was apparently out of order immediately following the attack in the district where the kidnap occurred.

The diplomatic license tags on the decoy car had been stolen from the Venezuelan Embassy more than a year before the attack.

THE JOHN BUTLER SCENARIO

On September 28, 1981 a Texaco Petroleum Manager in Colombia, Mr. John Butler, was returning from the Texaco offices to his residence in the northern part of Bogota. Butler was driving in a two-car motorcade. He was in the lead car, which was armored, and his bodyguards were in the follow-up car. At approximately 7:00 p.m., at the intersection of Avenue 125 with Highway 19, within 300 yards of his home, a powerful terrorist bomb exploded and immobilized the vehicle. The bomb, was concealed under a vendor's push cart, and was remote controlled and activated through a telephone line. A wire coming from a light pole detonated the device.



Two persons were seriously injured. Mr. Butler survived the incident. In the attempt, a young woman who was passing by was seriously injured. A guard was also injured.


At approximately 9:00 p.m. an anonymous caller, who said that he was a member of a city commando unit of the ELN "Union Camilista", telephoned EL TIEMPO and attributed the terrorist act to that movement.

The anonymous caller said that the seditious act against the high executive was carried out "as reprisal against Texaco's presence in Colombia and financing of para-military groups in the Medio Magdalena region, as well as the exploitation of Colombian natural resources by that multinational company.



Looking closely at the attempt on Mr. Butler we find that the terrorists set the bomb off prematurely. The definition of prematurely is .1 sec. to .2 sec's. A vehicle traveling 30 mph is traveling at the rate of 45 feet per sec. In .1 sec the car moves 4.5 feet. The bomb blast hit the front of Mr. Butler's car. If it was set off .1 sec later it would have hit the door. It is quite probable that Mr. Butler would have been seriously injured and more than likely killed if he had not been in an armored car.

The terrorist was attempting to detonate the bomb at the precise moment Butler's car drove by the cart. Fortunately, the bomb was detonated prematurely.



The full force of the blast hit the front of Butler's car. Although the car was damaged extensively, Butler survived.

The bomb that hit Butler's vehicle was detonated manually and set off prematurely. Although the bomb was detonated prematurely, there is no doubt Butler would have been at least seriously injured and probably killed if he had not been in an armored car.

THE ALFRED HERRHAUSEN SCENARIO

Herrhausen because he sat on the board of US companies, his assassination got the attention of CEO's. Moro and Schleyer were assassinated after negotiations had failed, with Herrhausen there were no negotiations – the plan was to assassinate him. He had a "Surveillance Detection Team", but it was not a very good, and completely unorganized. The event brought to focus the need for a well-organized and trained surveillance detection program. No amount of shooting, or driving training would have prevented this incident.




Alfred Herrhausen was the Chairman of the Deutsche Bank in Germany. He lived in Cologne - on Nov 30 1989 he was driving to work in his chauffeur driven armored vehicle.

Herrhausen's routine was to drive to work in a three car convoy. He was riding in the second vehicle, an armored Mercedes. He was accompanied by four bodyguards, two in a lead car and two in a

follow car – the four bodyguards were in non-armored Mercedes.

Herrhausen knew he had a valid threat.

The lead car drove ahead to block an intersection. They were expecting a Moro - Schleyer type of an ambush – the terrorist would attempt to block the principals' vehicle - eliminate the protection team – and take the principal.



They were prepared for that type of an attack – well trained and with the correct equipment.

They were not expecting an assassination.


While the lead car is blocking the intersection, Herrhausen, in the armored Mercedes, is moving down a narrow road with the follow car.

On the side of the road was a bicycle chained to a small pole. Attached to the bicycle was a bomb that consisted of about 44 pounds of explosives.

It was affixed to the luggage rack of a child's bicycle. The triggering device was a photo electric cell with its beam going across the road. When the light beam was broken it would ignite the bomb.

The photo cell had two switches – one operated by a RAF member standing nearby and the switch operated by the photo electric switch.

The purpose of the 2nd switch operated by the RAF member was to insure that the bomb would be denoted as Herrhausen's vehicle drove by and not by the lead car or any other vehicle that happen to drive by.



Two switches had to be closed in order for the bomb to be detonated. One switch was closed as the vehicle broke the light beam, but if the 2nd switch operated by the RAF was not closed the bomb would not detonate.

The terrorist had to wait for the lead car to go through the light beam, and once the lead car passed the light beam the terrorist closed the first switch.

The RAF member had to insure that the bomb would be denoted as Herrhausen's car drove by and not by the lead car or any other vehicle that happen to drive by.

When the observer saw Herrhausen's car was next they closed switch 2. When Herrhausen's car broke the light beam it closed switch 1 and ignited the Bomb

The bomb was placed so that it would hit Herrhausen's door.

They went to attend to Herrhausen – Herrhausen appeared to be OK
As the bomb hit a piece of metal hit Herrhausen in the femoral artery. He died from his wounds.

Herrhausen timeline:

- Sept 30th – surveillance of the area started
- Mid October – At the attack site posed as construction workers – doing road work.
- End of October – Started laying out the wiring that went to the RAF member to denote the bomb
- Nov 2nd – cut a hole in the cement to hide the wiring
- Nov 7th – put the bicycle on the pole and left it there for a few days – took the bicycle away for a few days and then put it back next to the pole. They did this up to the point that no one paid any attention to the bicycle.
- All this while a “Surveillance Detection team was in the area”

LESSONS LEARNED

The attack begins long before the first gunshot or the detonation of the bomb.

In all four attacks surveillance of the target and the route played a critical role in the attack planning process. The terrorists knew exactly where their victim was going to be. They predicted the time and location with incredible accuracy. **Surveillance Detection is Critical.**

It is essential for security providers to learn how, when and where an attacker is likely to conduct surveillance, as well as how to plan, manage and conduct effective surveillance detection operations. **Surveillance detection needs to be a major role in training and planning.**

In many situations, Herrhausen and Butler are classic examples, surveillance detection is not just the best protection; **Surveillance detection may be the only protection.**

Since the mid-sixties when Carlos Marighella’s Mini-Manual for The Urban Guerilla was popular reading for leftist groups throughout Latin America and Europe, pre-attack surveillance is something that many groups have relied heavily on throughout the attack planning process. The Al-Qaeda training manual is basically The Mini Manual in Arabic. **Google the title - Get the manual on line – Read it – It’s their game plan.**

Having bodyguards with guns doesn’t solve the problem – it creates a different problem. Know what the problem is and above all don’t underestimate the intelligence of your enemy. **Honor the threat.**

In all attacks it was obvious that the attack was well planned. If all of your training is centered on the reactive “once it happens” concept you are at a disadvantage. **Agent training needs to be proactive.**

Moro and Schleyer had the appearance of protection, as a protector, you have to know the difference between real protection and the appearance of protection. **Understand your limitations**

With Moro, Schleyer, and Herrhausen the protection teams were law enforcement officers. Law enforcement officers do not have the skill set needed to be a protection agent.

Protection officers need to be trained in protection

If the threat is kidnapping, the attackers will be careful to direct their fire away from the intended victim and concentrate on the security personnel. **The protection team will usually be eliminated first.**

With Schleyer and Moro, as with many other incidents, the terrorists eliminate the bodyguards swiftly and carefully. **In the two kidnappings the bodyguards never had a chance to return fire.**

You need to have the right equipment – that means a vehicle that can do the job. In a high risk environment doing the job is defined as an armored vehicle that will stop whatever rounds it is they are going to shoot at you. If you are in a Level 4 vehicle and they are firing Level 7 rounds, it's like taking a knife to a gunfight. **You need the right tools for the job.**

Armored cars do not protect against most roadside bombs. **Butler and Herrhausen's only solution was surveillance detection.**

Armored Vehicles:

- Bullet resistant glass means just that, it is bullet resistant not bullet proof.
- An armored car must be capable of absorbing the initial burst of fire and still have the capability to drive out of the ambush.
- History says that if the car is armored the terrorists will concentrate their fire at the glass.
- They will fire short bursts of rounds at a single location on the glass.

When armored vehicles are used understand their vulnerabilities

Time and time again we have seen that in a vehicle ambush the worst possible scenario is for the vehicle to come to a stop in the kill zone. Even in attacks against an armored vehicle, once the vehicle is immobilized the attackers have control over the movement of the target, and that is not a good thing. **Training must include the "Science of the Kill Zone". If the vehicle stops you lose.**

In the Herrhausen incident, the security was configured to protect against a kidnapping and not the roadside bomb that ultimately killed him, same with Butler. While it is virtually impossible to plan for every possible attack scenario, security providers should make every effort to find out exactly what capabilities an attacker might have, as well as what sort of attack the principal might be vulnerable to, despite existing security measures. **Expect the Unexpected - understand the threat.**

PRE-INCIDENT INDICATORS

Time and time again terrorists inadvertently give signals they are organizing an attack against the victim. These signals are called pre-incident indicators.

Detecting these pre-incident indicators requires alertness, and must become an unconscious habit. Paranoia should never be encouraged, but developing a good sense of what is normal and what is unusual in the environment (around the home, office and route taken to and from the home and office) could be the most important security precaution that can be taken. Noticing it is the first part, telling someone is the second, and then doing something about it is the third. The system is an easy one.

- **NOTICE IT**
- **TELL SOMEONE**
- **DO SOMETHING**

The Herrhausen incident is a good example of not noticing pre-incident indicators it took 48 days to set up, the Butler incident also took a significant amount of time.

Here are two men who obviously felt they have problems. They drive to work in an armored car, with bodyguards in a lead car and a follow car, and in the case of the Herrhausen incident for two weeks there is a construction crew less than 500 yards from his house and no one calls the city to ask if the road work is legitimate.

Although the technicality of the Herrhausen and Butler incident was impressive, in fact the key to success was the meticulous planning and surveillance by the terrorists. The problem was simple—the protection team was looking for the standard vehicle ambush, similar to Hans Martin Schleyer and Aldo Moro, and they got a roadside bomb. They were well organized to protect against the classical vehicle ambush and the terrorists knew that. The terrorists knew they were not looking for a bomb attack. Surveillance detection requires knowing what to look for. - **You can't find something you're not looking for.**